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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3058 
GEORGE STONE, Plaintiff in Error~ 
versus 
GEORGE W. IIELME. COMP ANY AND AMERICAN 
MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMP A.NY, 
Defendants in Error . 
. PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR FROM THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA. 
To the Honorable Chief J11-Stice and Associate J·ustices of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, George Stone, respectfully represents unto 
your Honors that he is greatly aggrieved by a decision and 
judgment rendered by the Industrial Commission of Virginia 
on July 31, 1945, affirming a decision rendered on June 5, 1945, 
by Commissioner Nickels dismissing petitioner's claim for 
compensation for a ventral hernia by him sustained by an 
accidental injury in the course of, and growing out of, his 
• employment by George V-l. Helme Company on December 20, 
l944. 
Notice of the decision and judgment of the full Commission 
was received by petitioner's counsel August 1, 1945. Peti-
tioner presents herewith a certified copy of the record before 
the hearing Qomniissioner and the full Commission, includ-
"ing the e-vidence, and avers that the finding and judgment of 
the said Commission is not sustained by the evidence and is 
contrary .to the law and the evidence in the case. Petitioner 
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prays that a writ of error or appeal may be awarded and that 
the decision and judgment of the said Commission may be 
reviewed and reversed by this Honorable Court. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 
Wherever italics appear· in any quotation in this petition 
they are supplied by the writer hereof unless otherwise speci-
fied. 
*~HE FACTS. 
There is· practically no conflict in the evidence in this case, 
and the facts herein stated appear from uncontradicted evi-
dence. There is some slight conflict in the evidence as . to 
whether or not petitioner fully understood the terms of the 
release signed by him for the Vance Trucking Company here- . 
inafter referred to, but since the validity or invalidity of that 
release is, in the opinion of petitioner's counsel, immaterial, 
the conflict in the evidence on that point may be disregarded 
and it may be assumed in this proceeding that the release is 
binding upon petitioner. In all other respects there is no con-
flict in the evidence. 
The petitioner, George Stone, an ignorant and inexperi-
enced workman, sustained an accidental injury while em-
ployed by George W. Helme Company in unloading a truck 
belonging to the Vance Trucking Company on December 20~ 
1944, by stepping into a hole in the floor of the tmck. He 
felt a severe pain in his left ventral region and his left ankle 
was twisted so that he thought it was broken. The employer 
had immediate notice of the accident and sent him to se·e Dr. 
Adkerson, who was the physician f o:r the employer's insur-
ance carrier, American Mutual Liability Insurance Company 
(R., pp. 1 and 2). Dr. Adkerson bandaged the ankle the first 
day and the next day examined petitioner's body in the region 
of his stomach on account of petitioner's complaint of pain, 
and found that petitioner had sustained a left ventral hernia 
on account of the accident (R., pp. 2 and 3). Petitioner had 
never suffered any pain nor injury in this region before and 
tll~ hernia, as well as the ankle injury, was undoubtedly 
caused by the accident -(R., pp. 3, 8 and ''Exhibit A", p. 
17). Dr. Adkerson reported the rupture upon his examina-
tion of petition-er the day after the injury (R., p. 9). Peti-
tioner has been .wholly disabled from doing any work from 
the date of the injury, Decem,ber 20, 1~44, until tlrn present· 
time, and has never been paid any compensation. 
George Stone v. George vV. Helme Co., et al. 3 , 
About a week after the accident petitioner went to his em-
ployer and said that l1e was hungry and wanted to- see 
3~ about *compensation. Defendant's ;manager, Jack 
Adams, testified 011 page 11, in answer to a question from 
defendant's attorney as to whether petitioner had made any 
claim for compensation, as follows: 
'' A. Well, he cam.e down the1·e in probably a week and said 
he was hu'llgry mul wanted to see about cornpensation. I told 
him that was up to the .insurance company as we had sent in 
the report.'' 
This language of the witness is sign'ificant when considered 
in connection with the petitioner's ignorance and inexperience 
and the subsequent events. At this point it may be well to 
bear in mind that neither this witness nor any other witness 
testified that petitioner was informed or knew what his rights 
were under the Compensation Law, nor what insurance com-
pany was supposed to pay him compensation or relieve his 
hunger, nor was he instructed by his employer where to go or 
what to do except that he was sent by his employer to Dr. 
Adkerson. He was wholly without experience and knew noth-
ing about leg-el matters or his legal rights, and unable to read 
and write (R., pp. 3, 8). 
It does not appear anywhere in the record tha.t petitioner 
knew the owner of the truck he was unloading when he re-
ceived his accident, nor did he know that he had any claim 
for damages against the truck own~r (R .. , p. 8). 
· Apparently petitioner continued to be treated by Dr. Ad-
kerson, who was the only representative wl10 seemed to do 
anything at all for him, and some time between .January 13th 
and January 17, 1945, Dr. Adkerson told him to gQ to see 
Mr. E. M. Bristow in the Krise Building, and be went there 
the first time on January 17, 1945 (R., p. 12). 
Apparently what had happened was this: tbe employer, 
George W. Helme Company, reported tl1e accident to its in-
surance carrier, but neither the employer nor the insurance. 
carrier took any steps whatever apparently to feed or other-
wise care for {he wants of this ignorant, crippled and help-
less employee, nor was be given any assurance that llis 
needs would be taken ca re of other than sending *him 
4* to the doctor from December 20., 1944, until after this 
claim was filed Feb. 15th, 1945. Although the employer 
bad full knowledge of the accident and injury and must have ' 
known its obligation to begin paying compensation by De-
cember 28, 1944, it let him suffer the pangs of hunger while 
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its insurance carrier was busy trying to make the Vance 
Trucking Company discharge its duty to relieve the wants of 
this man. Bristow te·sti:fi.es on page 12 that he got a letter 
on January 13, 1945, from his insurance company, which was 
evidently carrying liability insurance on the Vance Truck, 
enclosing '' some correspondence from Georg·e W. Helme 
Company and the Vance Trucking Company regarding an 
injury to George Sterne, an employee of the Heline Company." 
Bristow got in touch with the Helme Company and also its 
doctor,-Dr. Adkerson, and asked Dr. Adkerson to send 
Stone to see him,-Bristow, and Dr. Adkerson evidently com-
plied with that request because Bristow testifies that Stone 
came into his office on Ja:imary 17., 1945. 
At this time petitioner's needs had still not been taken care 
of and he was about to starve to death (R., p. 5). 
Even at this time nothing was done for petitioner, nor was 
l1e advised in any way how or where he could get the urg·ently 
needed relief. At that first visit Bristow said: 
"I talked to him and took his statement from llim, wl1ich 
he signed, and told him I would have to take it up with rny 
company, that I did not know what they would do with it, 
that it was a compensation case." 
It will be noted that Bristow does not testifv that he told 
petitioner who "my company" was, nor where ··or how to g·et 
compensation. Bristow was an adjuster representing many 
insurance companies in Lynchburg, but he does not appear 
to have told petitioner whether his company would handle 
the compensation or not. As a matter of fact, Bristow was 
representing the .American Fidelity and Casualty Company, 
insurance carrier for the Vance Trucking Company. 
Two ·days later Mr. Olsen, representing the American 
Mutual Liability Insurance Company, the insurance carrier 
for the employer., George W. Helme Company, came into 
5* Mr. Bristow's office. He does not *appear, however, to 
have gotten in touch with petitioner, nor to have ta.ken 
· any steps to relieve his hunger. 
Since Bristow was. the only man who seemed to have given 
this ignorant, hungry and crippled employee any hope of re-
lief, he returned to Bristow's office several times, and finally, 
on January 31, 1945, received from Bristow $150.00, for which 
petitioner signed a release which is filed as "Exhibit A.'', and 
will be found on page 18 of the· record. . 
It is in connection with the signing of this release that we 
find the only apparent conflict in the testimony., and it is sub-
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mitted tlmt the conflict as to whether or not petitioner under-: 
stood the effect of the release that be was signing is more 
apparent than reaJ. It is realized that for the P-Urposes of 
this appeal the testimony of Bristow on this point must be 
jaken as absolutely true. His evidence on the point is brief, 
and when considered in connection with petitioner's ignorance 
and desperate need, lacks a lot of establishing that he clearly 
explained or that pe.titioner understood that the signing of 
the release would in any way affect his compensation claim. 
All of I1is testimony on that point is quoted in full as fol-
· 1ows: 
"And Stone came back to see me several times later and 
wanted to know what would be done. I explained to him that 
any settlement we made with him would end it in so far as 
we were concerned. And on January 31, 1945, he came back 
into the office and said that we should pay him $150.00. I asked 
him if $150.00 would satisfy him, and he said 'Yes\ that it 
would be all right and he would take the money and go back 
to Martinsville where he came from. We settled the case 
with him and he signed the release.· I read the release to him, 
explaining it fully, and he said he understood it thoroughly 
and he signed the release in the presence of Mrs. Cook, who 
is in my office, and of myself and we witnessed his signa-
ture'' (R., pp. 12-13). 
And again Bristow testifies about this release as follows: 
"..About a iveek later ( after January 31, 1945), he came ba,ck 
to my office and wanted to kno,1.v 'W'hat more we were going 
to do about it. I told him that, so far as the settlement against 
the Vance Tntcking Company was concerned, it was closed. 
And he asked me where he cou.ld take 'lt1J about the compensa-
. tion and I wrote the name of the lnd·u,::,1rial Commission on a 
slip of paper. .And 1£e went invniediately from my office 
6* and, preswmably; he went *to Mr. Easley's office, be-
cau.se Mr. Easley ca·me to my office that afternoon" (R., 
p. 13). 
Up until February 7th when Bristow gave this memoran-
dum to George Stone, which wiil be found as '' Exhibit D'' on 
page 20 of the record, giving the name and address of the 
Industrial Commission and of the defendant, American 
Mutual Liability Insurance Company, this unlettered, inex-
perienced, injured employee had not' consulted or been ad-
vised of his rights by anyone except the vag·ue statements of 
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· the employer's manager that it was a compensation matter 
and up to the insurance company, and Dr. Adkerson!s action 
in sending .him to see Bristow and Bristow's explanation as 
herein quoted. Bristow was asked specifically whether he ex-
plained to Stone that his accepting the sorely needed $150.00. 
and signing the release might affect Stone's right to compen-
sation. His reply was : 
, "I told him if he 1made a settlement against the third party 
that would relieve the compensation of an.lJ claim against the 
employer. . • · 
'' Q. Those were the words you told him? 
"A. Yes., sir" (R.,. p. 14): 
This last quoted "explanation" of Bristow's about the ef-
fect of the release was made to George Stone on January 31st 
when he signed the release. BriBtow l,a.i,d that these were the 
very words that he used to Stone.. It is submitted that a per ... 
son of much more education and intelligence and experience 
than George Stone could easily have been misled into be-
lieving that the signing of the release of the Vance Trucking 
Company would relieve the p~titioner of bis nec.essitous cir ... 
cumstances and clear up all delay so that he would get the 
compensation which Bristow had told him all along he was en-
titled to and which Mr. Adams, the employer's manager, had 
also told him he would get from some insurance company. 
It is fairly certain that George Stone so understood the ex-
planation because we find him coming back to Bristow's office 
to get the compensation on February 7th, when Bristow gave 
him the name and address of the Indnstrial Commission, with 
which he wandered into the office of his present counsel, 
who, after questioning him and Bristow, wrote «ca letter 
7* the sam~ day,-February 7th, to Bristow repudiating the 
settlement (R., pp. 14, 15, and "Exhibit C", p. 19). 
Another fact of great importance is the total lack of any 
evidence that George Stone ever had any valid claim or right 
of action against the Vance Trucking Company. The evi-
derice is very brief ,-only sixteen pages, and there is not a 
syllable of evidence to show how the hole got into the floor of 
the truck. So far as the record shows, George Stone may 
have knocked the bole in the floor of the. truck l1imself. It 
might have been caused by some third .party, or by the Act 
Qf God, without any negligence whatever on the part of the 
Vance Trucking Company. There is no evidence as to the 
size of the hole, and it might very well_ have been that George 
Stone was guilty of the grossest kind of contributory negli-
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gence. The only light thrown on -tliat question in the eptire 
record is the statement in the 'release signed by Geor,qe Stone 
that "it is fu,rther imderstood and agreed that the payment 
of the said sum is 11ot, and is not construea as an admission on 
the part of the said Vance 'l.'ntckin,q Co., Inc., of any lia,bility 
whatsoe'lJcr in consequence of said accident" (R..~ p. 18). 
This claim for compensation was duly filed with the Com-
pensation Commission, and a hearing was had thereon by 
Commissioner Nickels on May 16, 1945, resulting in an order 
entered. ,June 5, 1945, dismissing petitioner's claim (R., p . 
. 29), and on review by the full Commission the decision of 
Commissioner Nickels was affirmed on July 31, 1945 (R., p. 
34). After due notice to oppo~ing counsel, petitioner, through 
his counsel, obtained a certified copy of the record on the 
17th of August., 1945. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.. 
Petitioner assigns as enor the decision of the Commission 
in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation, and this 
assignment of error is further particularized as follows: 
(1) The Commission erred in holding that petitioner was 
reql1ired to, and did, make an election, and having elected 
8* to accept *a nominal settlement from the Vance Truck-
ing Company, he was thereby estopped from claiming 
compensation. 
(2) The Commission erred in holding that the insurance 
carrier had any rig·ht of subrogation to any claim ag·ainst 
the Vance Trucking Company. . 
(3) The Commission erred in holding that petitioner ever 
had a valid right of action against the Vance Trucking Com-
pany fo which any potential right of subrogatio_n could apply. 
There was no evidence whatever of any negligence on the 
part of th~ Vance Trucking Company, and its liability is de-
nied in the release it took from petitioner, and the amount 
paid was wholly disproportionate to the injuries sustained 
by petitioner and indicated that the claim had a nuisance 
value only. At the hearing petitioner offered to credit any 
award by the $150.00 he had received from the Vance Truck-
ing Company. 
( 4) The Commission erred in holding that petitioner has 
received one fu:U recovery for his injuries because it is ob-
vious that full recovery would have amounted to mtmy times 
the small sum of $150.00 received by petitioner. · 






of estoppel against the employer· and. insurm~~~ : ~arrier tQ 
prevent them froin taking inconsistent positions: in the course 
of the controversy, first denying liability for the hernia and 
withholding compemration until petitioner was driven:by utte1: 
destitution to accept a pittance from the Vance Trucking Com-: 
pany, arid then changing ·their position, in effect saying, ''Yes, 
we were Ii~ ble to pay· compensation all the: time,' and there by 
we coulir have acquired· a rig11t of \fohrqgatio1i against the 
Vance Trucking C9mpany, but yoJI, by your settlement., have, 
pr~vented. p~~ ~cquiring: a~y rigpt tjf' subr9ga~io~. ~' 
THE LA\¥. 
. . 
In the first place, it is admitted that under the statute, as 
· it now stands, ·petitioner was not confronted with a choic~ 
9.* of « two iilccrµsistent · remedies where. he was compelled 
. . to make an election of one or the other remedy. Suen 
was the case at various times and under v.arious "iimendments 
of Section 12 of the' Act between 1924 and l 936, but the rights 
of the petitioner a.re g·Qverned: by the Act ·as it stood unde1~ 
the 1920 ameiidment of :Sect.ion 12. · 
· Noblir,i v. Ra,n~lolvh CJ9rporQttion, 180 Va. 345. At page 357 
the court said : . . ' .' ~ ' . , . 
"This was the status of the statute, as constr.ued by this 
court, when the General .Assembly in 1936' decided to repeal 
all amendments to Section 12 adopted · after l920 and to re~ 
enact the 1920 amendment with an addition hereinafter. 
quoted~ It is signific(Jlfl,t to note that the part of the 1924: 
amendment, which compelled an injured employee to elect 
whether he would procee·d in an action at law. against the third 
party, or p.roceed with his claim for conipensation against his 
employer was not included in the 1920 amendment. * • • This 
last amendment restored the law to· the exact stat·us that it 
was when the decisions in the Srn..ith and, Palmer cases were 
rendered. Where a repeaJed statute, p"rev.iously construed 
by the court is re-enacted by the· Iegisla ture, the construction 
given to it is presurned to be sanctioned by the legislature and 
becomes obligatory upon the courts. Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va~ 
160, 112 S. E. 757. . . . 
"(4, 5.) In the cases construing the 1920 amendment to 
Section 12, it was held that the acceptance of an wward from 
·the Industrial Commission was not a bar to a claim by the in-
jured· employee against ·the negligent third. party·. It follows 
that the converse of that proposition is equallp true,~that. 
• • : . l 
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·the procurement of a jiidgment which is unsatisfied is not a 
bar to the prosecidion of a claim against the employer.'' 
The above quotation makes it abundantly clear that an in-
jured employee does not have to elect, but may proceed simul-
taneously against both the employer to recover compensation 
· and against a negligent third party; or he may proceed first 
against one and then ag·ainst the other. This is never true in 
any case of election. In true cases of election the remedies 
are inconsistent with each other and can in no case be pur-
sued simultaneously. It is true that in the Noblin case the 
opinion and decision then proceeds to .discuss another and an 
entirely different but limited right given to the employe.r 
·under Section U as it stands today,.!.-the limited right of 
subrogation which we will discuss later. . 
The doctrine of election is based upon the doctrine of 
estoppel and is included in the broad principles. of estoppe}: 
'' The doctrine of election is founded upon estoppel · ancl 
estoppel is an equitable rule. Intervening equities 
1()* *might work an estoppel, although it had not been . in 
· terms ordered." Pollard and Bagby v. Thalhimer, 169 
Va. 529, at page 536. 
.. It is perfectly certain that the statute in terms does not 
require an election of remedies, and the Noblin case clearly 
holds that under the present statute the doctrine of elect·ion 
does not apply to an injured employee. 
Moreover, the equitable principle of estoppel can not apply 
as against the petitioner. He had no full knowledge of his 
rights, nor did he know all of the facts and circumstances as 
to th~ transactions ·between his employer, its· insuranGe car-
rier, and the Vance Trucking Company and its insurance car-
rier, nor the possible consequences of his signing a release 
.of any claims he might have against Vance Trucking Com-
pany for the paltry sum of $150.00. 
Peculiarly applicable to the case under consideration, in so 
far as it applies to the estoppel of the petitioner, is the fol: 
lowing quotation, supported by ample authority, from the case 
of .A:mericGlfl, National Bank v . ..A:mes, 169 Va., at page 733: 
"It is elementary that estoppel will never lie unless the 
party against whom it is invoked had full knowledge of his 
rights and all the material facts and drcumsta~ces of the 
case. He can not waive or acquiesce in a wrong when 
ignorant of its eaYistence. He can not ratify an act unless he 
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knows it bas been done. The burden of proving that a person 
has full knowledge of his 1rights and that he inten,d.~ to waive · 
them is upon the party who asserts estoppel or ratification as 
a defense. And such knowledge 'must be clearly and plainly 
shown.' 1 
So much for the doctrine of election or estoppel as applied 
to the petitioner. We will have more to say later upon the 
doctrine of estoppel as applied to the employer. 
We come now to the question of the employer's right of 
subrogation. This i& an entirely different right from the em-
ployer's right which existed prior to the 1936 amendment to 
require the employee to elect. It is limited by the language 
of Section 12, and is here invoked, not by the employer, but 
by the insurance carrier, and the limited rights of such in-
surance carrier are created and defined in the third 
11 * paragraph of Section 12, which ~reads as follows: 
'' Where any employer is insured against liability for com-
pensation with any insurance1 carrier, and such insurance car-
rier shall have paid any conipensation for which the employer 
is liable or shall have assumed the liability of the eniployer 
there! or, it shall be subrogated to 'all the 'rights and duties 
of tlie employer, and may en/ orce any such rights in its own 
name or in the name of the injured employee or his or her per-
sonal representative; provided, however, nothing herein shall 
be construed as conferring upon insurance carriers any other 
or further rights than those existing in the employer at the 
time of the injury to his employee, anything_ in the policy of 
insurance to the contrary notwithstanding.'' 
In the case at bar the insurance carr:ier had never paid, 
nor assumed liability for, one penny of compensation. As a 
matter of.fact, on January 31st, when petitioner signed the 
release, the insurance carrier had expressly refused to assume 
liability by its letter dated January 30, 1945, and referred to 
.on page 2 of the opinion of Commissioner Nickels. Not a 
penny of compe,isation, has yet been paid by anyone, and it is 
certain that petitioner did not file his claim, lawful or other-
wise, against the employer until long after January 31st, as 
the record in this case will show: 
That the right of subrogation does not and can not arise 
in such circumstances under the present language of Section 
12 is shown conclusively by the Noblin case where the court 
says on page 363 : 
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''How ever, the carrier is not entitled to exercise the right 
of subrogation until he 'shalb have paid any compensation. fo·r 
which tlie employer is liable or shall have assumed the Uability 
of the employer therefor'. To date the ·carrier has not c01ik 
plied with either of these conditions. If and when the em-
ployer or the carrier has complied with the conditions stated 
in the statitte, the right of subrogation may be enforced by a 
propet proceeding in the Circuit Gou.rt of Halifax Cou·nty 
when'. the judgnient was obtained.'' · 
In the Noblin case the liability of the third party had been . 
established beyond question. A final judgment had been en-
tered up in favor of the injured employee against the wrong-
doer. But neither the insurance carrier nor the employer had 
paid, or assumed liability for, compensation. In the case at 
bar, not only has the employer and its insurance carrier 
failed to prove that either of them had paid, or assumed 
12* liability for.the payment of, compensation, *so as to give 
. rise to a right of subrogation, but they have failed to 
prove that any right of action existed against. the Vance 
Trucking Company. So the present claim for compensation 
is even stronger than the claim to compensation in the Noblin. 
case. Yet this C(;mrt, tn, an unanimous opinion, held that 
Noblin was entitled to compensation, and if and when sur.h 
compensation was actually paid, and only upon the payme·n;t 
of such compensation, would the employer or its carrier be 
entitled to subrogation. 
In construing the statute, including that part of it giving 
to the employer .or the insurance carrier any rig·ht of subro-
gation, it must be borne in mind that the statute and all amend-
ments were enacted for the benefit of the employee and not 
for the benefit of the employer or its insurance carrier. See 
Byrd v. 8tonega Coke etc., Company, 182 Va. 212, where the 
Court, at page 221, said: 
"The Workmen.'s Conipensation Act was adopted for th,e 
benefit of the emplovees and their dependents. It should be 
liberally construed in order to obtain the des-ired results.'' 
To· construe and apply Section 12 as contended for by the 
defendants in this case certainlv would not be "for the benefit 
of employees and their dependents" .• On the contrary, the 
effect would be in this particular case to rob the injured em-
ployee of a large part of the compensation to which he was 
admittedly ent~tled, a_nd would. be to construe and apply the 
Act ~s though its mam purpose was to benefit the insurance 
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carrier and to enable it to escape payment of sums which it 
justly should have paid long ago. 
Under the ordinary principles of subrogation, which is an 
equitable doctrine or principle created by courts of equity in 
order to prevent injustices, subrogation does not arise and 
can not be enforced in any event at the expense of the creditor 
( the injured employee), or in such a way as to prejudice his· 
rights in any manner; npr does it arise until actual payment 
to the origina,l creditor. It is not dependent upon contract, 
but is founded upon principles of justice, equity and benevo· 
lence. Ordinarily it ·can. not be enforced until the whole of 
the debt i~ paid. The origin, nature, application and ef-
13* feet of subrogation is clearly set forth in the *case of 
Obici v. Furcron, 160 Va. 351, at page 360, as follows: 
'' As stated by Judge Woods in Livingstain v. Colu/mbian 
Banking~ Trust Co., 77 S. C. 305, 57 S. E. 182, 184, 22 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 442, 122 Am. St. Rep. 568: 'The doctrine of sub-
rogation is a pure, unmixed equity, having its foundation in 
·the principles of natural justice;' Gadsden v. Broum (Speers, 
Eq. (S. C.) 37), supra. As has often been said, it does not 
.flow from any fixed law, but from principles of justice, equity, 
and benevolence. Cheesebrough v. Millard, 1 Johns, Ch. (N. 
Y.) 409 (7 Am. Dec. 494). Obviously, therefore, subrogation 
will not be decreed in favor of one when it would defeat a 
legal rig·ht or· overthrow an equal or superior right of an-
other. .A:merica;n Bonding Co. v. National Mechanics' Bank, 
99 Am. St. Rep. 480 and 502. '' 
Mr. Freeman, in a note to the above case (99 Am. St. Rep. 
480), has this to say : 
"Since subrogation is a creature of equity, it must be en-:-
f orced with a due regard to the rights, legal or equitable, of 
others. It cannot be invoked so as to work injustice, or de-
f eat a legal right, or overthrow a superior or perhaps even 
an equal equity, or displace an intervening right or title." 
See Combs v. Agee, 148 Va. 471, 139 S. E. 265; Morgan v. 
Gollehon, 153 Va. 246, 149 S. E. 485. · 
Judg·e Burks, in Sherman's Adm'r v. Shaver, 75 Va. 1, 8, 
defines the doctrine thus: '~ The rig·ht of subrogation: broad 
~nd comprehensive as_ it is admitted to be, has its limits, and 
1s by no means a matter of course, under all circumstances, 
even in favor of sureties. It is a creature of equity and is 
n,ever enforced to the injury or p1·ejudice of the creditor, 
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whose rights and re1nedies are so·ught to be used ( Gntbbs v. 
Wysors, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 127, 131), nor against the superior 
equities of third persons.'' · 
Of course, when the word '' subroga to" is used in the 
statute, it necessarily carries the meaning given to that word 
by a long line of qecisions of our Court of Appeals, and it 
· seems too clear for argument that neither the employer nor 
its insurance carrier has ever had any right of subrogation 
to any claim, real or imaginary, of the petitioner against the 
Vance Trucking Company .. 
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED. 
While the petitioner is not estopped from claiming com-
pensation by reason of having released his claims against the 
Vance Trucking Company because he did not act with full 
knowledge of his rights nor of all of the surrounding facts 
and circumstances as hereinbefore shown, the defendants, on 
the other hand, are estopped by tJ~ir conduct prior to 
14* January 31st from setting up now the defense *that the 
petitioner has wrongfully deprived them of substantial 
rights. Even if the defendants have proven ( as they have 
not), that petitioner ever had a lawful right of action against 
Vance Trucking· Company, they would .still be estopped from 
setting up the defense of the release of the Vance Trucking 
Company. It is well settled that no litigant can take dif-
ferent and inconsistent positions in the course of a contro-
versy or litigation about the same matter. 
It is established beyond question in this case that the em-
ployer impliedly, by its course of conduct in failing and re-
fusing each and every week from December 28, 1944, to J anu-
ary 31, 1945, to pay petitioner his weekly compensation, and 
expressly, by the letter of January 30, 1945, denied liability 
for the hernia on the sole ground that vetitioner's disa,bility 
(hernia) llid not result from, the accident. During all that 
period there was no possible contention or pretense that pe-
·titioner had made any settlement of his claim against the 
Vance Trucking Company, or in anywise prejudiced defend-
anis' potential subrogati.on claims against the Vance Truck-
ing· Company. In fact, the position of the defendants dur-
ing that long period, and expressly in· the letter of Janu_ary 
30th, was that since they were not liable for, and did not as-
sume, the payment of compensation, they could not possibly 
·ever be subrog·ated to any claim against the Vance Trucking 
Company. And by this course of conduct the employer drove 
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its crippled and destitute employee .in utter desperation into 
the hands of a representative of the Vance Trucking Com-
pany. Petitioner acted upon this position ·and course of con-
duct of the defendants, and accepted payment of the paltry 
sum of $150.00 from the Vance Trucking Company. The de-
fendants, having taken the position that there was never any 
liability for compensation and the petitioner having been .in-
duced to act as he did in releasing the Vance Trucking Com-
pany by reason of the position taken by the defendants, they· 
wil~ :µot now be permitted to change their positi~n and say 
,n effect, '' Oh, yes, we knew all about the accident and had 
our doctor treat you, and we knew about the hernia and your 
disability and your destitute condition, but we refuse to 
15* pay you compensation *because we were never liable for 
it", and continue to say that in effect until afte1· the re-
lease was signed, and then to say, '' Oh, yes, we knew we really 
were liable all the while, and you knew it too, but you went 
and released the Vance Trucking Company so that if and 
when we paid you compensation we couldn't sue the Vance 
Trucking· Company. and get reimbursed''. These positions · 
are utterly irreconcilable. 
It is highly significant, that at the hearing the defendants 
made no contention, and introduced ·no evidence whatever to 
prove that the hernia was not caused by the accident. They 
knew of the hernia and its cause from the day after the ac-
cident; and they must have known they were legally liable 
for the payment of compensation and of Petitioner's desti-
tute condition,- but, for some inexplicable reason of heartless 
cl'uelty or gross neglect, denied liability and failed to per-
form their plain statutory duty to pay compensation until 
Petitioner was driven by utter misery and want into accept-
ing help from Mr. Bristow. Defendants offered no pretense 
of an explanation or excuse for their change of position. 
The general rule of equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais 
is that when one person, by his· statements, conduct, action~ 
behavior, concealment or even silence, has induced another 
who had a right to rely upon those statements, conduct, ac-
tion, behavior, concealment or silence and who does rely and 
act upon them in good faith, the former will not be allowed to 
assert thereafter, as against the latter, the existence of a 
different state of facts from those indicated bv such ~.tate. 
ments, conduct, action, behavior, concealment or· even silence. 
This broad principle of estoppel applies in full force to a 
litigant who, in the course of a controversy, takes one position 
before the litigation and undertakes to set up a different and· 
inconsistent position in the course of the litigation. This is 
Gein~g~ Stop~ v. (fopr-g~ ,v. H~hµ~ OQ., et al. is 
sh9w:ri clear,ly by tha fqllqwing qµQt;;ition froJ:n Hurfoy v. B~n-
n~tt, +6a Va. 2fl : 
~ ~ Thn13 b.efore th~ j:µstit.utimi of tbe &u.it, !l:Pd for more 
tp~µ t4J!~~ yea~~ t4~r~a.ft~r, tha First ij"ational Bank of 
Gmnqy, pF it~ re~~iv~:r, 4~~. r~~ogm..z~d tpe validity of 
· 16• -the deed *in pqµti:~nrpr~y. It suggests no reason for the 
clmllg~ 9f it~ pQE!itio~. .A. par-ty can not in the cmn-se 
of the eia111~ litig:~tipn Q~~llPY iti~A:q.sistant positfons. Unon 
thflt r~le ~le~tiqn is f qµpqeq; & litig~nt will not be allowed 
in. the hiµgu.age Af t4~ S~Atc4 law to '?PPl'Obll.te' and 'repro~ 
hate'. Wh~Fe. 4~ luis an. ~leptio:ri b.phv~~n inconsist~nt courses • 
of aption, 49 will b~ ~-QP.fiPP<l tp that cb.ang~ he first adopts. 
r;r1p.e µr~t el~~tip:q, if w~q~ with knowlt3clge of tho facts, is it-
self pizlding; 4r.w<rna v~ Hill's Aa1mr., 135 Va. 235, 117 S. El. 
6QS; ¥ q,,qlr v~ Flyer, 15Q V~~ BOS, l43. S. E. p90; White v. Bott. 
158 Va. 4!l?, 1Q8 ~~ :m. 8SO, ma S.. E. 397, a1ld ca~as ther-eiri 
cite¢!..'' 
More directly in point n~rhfl-P.S i~ the following quotation 
from White v. Bott, supra at page 454: 
"'Where ~ party gives a reason for his conduct and de-
cision touching a~yt4fng ~volv~d in. th~ flont:rQversy, he can 
not, after litigation has begun, change his ground and put 
his cqnduct up~:q anot413r ~m:l diff~i!ent cpn~ideration." · 
In Na~qle v. Syer, lpO V~., ~t mu~~ 513, the Supreme Court 
approv~s and aµoP,ts th~ f91lmving quAt&tion from Ariv.qod 
v~ Hill's Adm'r~, 1;35 V~. ~S5: 
'f 4- p~r,ty ca:.p.n~t, eith~r, jn tpf3 cQm·se o.f litigation or in 
dealings in pais, occupy inconsistent positions. Upon that 
rtJ.le ele(!tion is fou:qded; a :man ~hfl-ll not be allowed, in the' 
langultg~ of tl:ie Scotch. l~w, ftq &p,m·obate a:nd 1~eb1!obate' . 
.And who1!a a man has an eleptiAn hetwf3ep. seveiml inconsist-
~:nt cqur.ses of ij~tion, he wm p~ cpµfin.f3d to that course which 
he :first adopts; th~ electiq~, if ·piade with lnwwledge of the 
(~cts, i~ itself bi~di~g, ft cnmwt be withdrawn, though it has 
:pot pe~n a(3ted upQn py a:p.qthar by any change of position. 
llis'.elqw All Estoppal, p~g~ 733.'' 
I:p. tl}e pr-e~fmt cys~ t4e emg}Qyer ~nd its insuranco car-
r.ier, in the beginning, toqlr, llnd maintained tpereafter until 
tllf3 h~ftring of ¥ay 16th, tpe P9flition. that there was no lia-
bility ror. compensation because the hernia did not result from 
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the accident. At the hearing of this claim on May. 16th, thti 
employer and its insurance carrier, for the first time, under-
took to switch this position and say that from the beginning 
they were liable for the hernia, and that such liability gave 
them, by subrogation, a right of action against· Vance Truck-
ing· Coµipany, which petitioner destroyed by signing the re-
lease. This they are estopped from doing. 
If it be assumed that defendants ever had even a potential 
right of action by subrogation. ag·ainst Vance Trucking Com-
pany they adm,ittedly failed and refused, wrongfully 
17* and oppressively, to pay petitioner *any compensation 
from December 28, 1944, so that he was driven by starva-
tion to accept what he could get from some other source by 
signing the release, so that the signing of the release was the 
direct and natural result of the wrongdoing of the def end-
ants. They should not be permitted to profit by the conse-
quences of their own wrongdoing or neglect of duty. · 
The last quotations above are supported by au array of · 
authorities, including the United States Supreme Court and 
numerous decisions of our own court. 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted: 
(1) Section 12, a~ it stands today, does not require an elec-
tion by an injured employee, especially when construed lib-
erally in favor of the injured employee. . 
(2) Under the decision in the Noblin case, the only effect 
of Section 12, as it stands today, is to limit the injured em-
ployee to one f'ull recovery, and it is obvious tliat the injured 
employee in this case has never received anything like a full 
recovery. 
· (3) No right of subrogation is given by Section 12 except 
to a~ employer or insurance carrier who has actiially paid full 
compensation, as clearly stated in the Noblin case, and 
neither the employer nor his carrier has paid, nor assumed 
the payment of, one cent of compensation. 
( 4) Employer has wholly failed to bear the burden of 
proving affirmatively the existence at any time of any valid 
right of ac~ion against the Vance Trucking Company, nor 
even the existence of any claim of value beyond the nominal 
or nuisance value of $150.00, and peti~ioner has offered to 
credit his compensation claim by that amount, which would, 
in any event, limit him to one full recovery and give the em-
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ployer and its carrier credit for the full value of any imag .. 
inary right of action against Vance Trucking Company. . 
(5) Employer and its carrier, with full knowledge of aU 
of the facts, having· taken and ·maintained the . position 
18* until the actual *trial of this case· that the ground of 
its non-liability was that the disabling hernia did not 
result from the accident, is now estopped from switching their 
position and asserting that they were liable all the while for 
compensation resulting in a potential limited right of sub. 
rogation which had been prejudiced by petitioner's signing 
the release of January 31st.· . 
{6) Finally, the award of compensation, subject to a credit 
of $150.00, will carry out the beneficent purposes of the law, 
giving to this ignoran~, injured and helpless employee only 
the relief which the law plainly contemplates he should have 
without doing ·vfolence to the rights of anyone. It will re-
quire of the defendants to pay belatedly merely what they 
justly and clearly should have paid petitioner in .weekly in-
stallments beginning December 28, 1944. 
Wherefore, petitioner prays that an appeal may be· awarded 
petitioner from the aforesaid opinion, decision and judgment 
of the Industrial Commission of Virginia rendered on July · 
31st, 1945, and that the same may be reviewed and reversed 
and that this Honorable Court enter such order as the said 
Commission .should have entered. 
Petitioner avers that he did, before filing this petition with 
the Clerk of your Honors' Court, deliver a ·copy of this peti-
tion to Caskie, Frost and ·watts; attorneys for the defend-
ants, in the City of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
If. an appeal is allowed, this petition will be treated as pe-
titioner's opening brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE STONE, Petitioner. 
By JOHN D. EASLEY, 
JOHN D. EASLEY, 
His Attorney. 
I, John D. Easley, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that I liave 
read the record and petition for an appe·a1 in the foregoing 
case of George Stone v. George W. Helme Company and 
19• American Mutual Liability "'Insurance Company lately 
pending before the Industrial Commission of Virginia, 
18 SuyJreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
and, in my judgment, said case should. be reviewed by the 
said Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Given under my hand_ this 29th day of August, 1945. 
JOHN D. EASLEY. 
Received August 30, 1945. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
September 12, 1945. Appelll grant~d. ~ond $~00.00. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
Received September 17, 1945. 
l\L B. W. 
RECORD 
Ins. Carr. No. 44-WC-257580-10482. 
George Stone, Claimant, . 
v. 
George W. Helme Company, Employer., American Mutual 
Liability Insurance Company, Insurer. 
Claim No. 762-191. 
Claimant appeared in person. 
John D. Easley, Attorney-at-law, Krise Building,, Lynch-
burg, Virginia, for claimant. -
Caskie, Frost and Watts (James R. Caskie), Attorneys-at-
law, Peoples National Bank Building, Lynchburg, Virginia~ 
for defendant. 
Hearing ·before Chairman Nickels, at Lynchburg, Virginia, 
May 16, 1945. 
Mr. Caskie: We admit the accident. 
Commissioner: It is admitted that George Stone sustained 
an acciµent on December 20, 1944, while working for the em-
ployer at an average weekly wage of $32.60. The question at 
issue is whether the claimant sust~ined a ventral hernia pur-
suant to the provisions of · Section 2 ( e) of tho Workmen's 
• f 
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George Stone. 
Compensation Act, its causal relationship to the accident of 
December 20, 1944, and whether t"4e claimant.~ having taken 
satisfaction from the· third party,. is entitled to compensa-
tio~ .. 
All witnesses having been sworn, the following testimony 
was taken, viz. : 
GEORGE STONE, 
Claimant. 
By ·Mr. Easley: _ 
Q. You rec~ived an accident in the course of your employ-
ment by the George W. Helme Company, on December 20, 
1944, while unloading a truck down there, by stepping into a 
bole in the truck., did you not? 
page 2 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what pain did you fe.el, if any, at the time you 
stepped into the hole? · 
A. A pain down here ( in the left ventral region) and run-
ning up here- (left epigastrium). . · 
Q. What kind of pain did you feel 7 
A. Like someone had stuck" a knife in me. 
Q. ·w11at other injury or pain did you receive, if anything? 
A. I thought at first my left ankle was broken. 
Q. Did your employer send you to any physician? 
A. I worked on until night, and they gave me a card and 
next morning I_ went at 11 :00 o'clock to s~e him. 
Q. Did your employer give you a ,card to go to see the 
doctor? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. To what doctdr did they send you? 
A. Dr. Adkerson. 
Q. Did he treat you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
- Q. What did he do to you? 
A. He bandaged up my ankle the first day. The next day I 
told him about the pain in my stomach and he put tape on niy 
stomach and kept it taped all the time. - -
Q. Did he subsequently send you to' any other doctor? 
A. Yes, sir; to Dr. Devine. · 
Mr. Evans: I wish to intro.duce this letter, dated May 10, 
· 1945, from Dr. John W. Devine. The agent for the 
page 3 ~ insurance carrier took him up· to see Dr. Devine. 
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Commissioner : . That is not disputed. 
Note: Said letter, being a carbon copy, typewritten., is 
here :filed and identified as "Exhibit 'A' ". 
. ' 
By ]\fr. Easley: . 
Q. Had you ever had that sort of trouble in your stomach 
beforeY · 
A. No, sir; never had. . · 
Q. · Never had until the date of this accident Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you felt that immediately? 
A. -Yes, sir. 
Q. And Dr. Adkerson strapped you up and ~ent you to 
Dr. Devine? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you been able to do any wo!k since then 1 
A. I can go back but cannot stay very long; work maybe 
a half day a·nd have to quit. · 
Q. Can you do any lifting at all? 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. Can you read or write? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You cannot do anything except laborT 
A. That is right. Never had but 4 days schooling in my 
life. 
Q. Where were you brought up? 
A. At Chatham, Virginia. 
Q. Where? 
A. ·On a farm. 
page 4. ~ Commissioner: That is unimportant. . How will 
that help me? 
Mr. Easley: I think it will come around after a while as 
for the question of release. · 
Mr. Caskie : · He cannot set aside the release in this pro-
ceeding. That is up to the Court. 
Commissioner: That is a legal question. Let us fir.st go 
into the facts. The fact is that the settlement bas been made. 
To make an attack on ·collateral settlement is foreign to me, 
is it not? I am not interested in wher.e the man was born. I 
do not wish to read a whole lot of evidence of no value to 
me. Let us have something m9re substantial than that. Go 
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into the question of why he made the settlement and the con-
clitions under which he made it. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. Now, you were sent by your employer to Dr. Adkerson Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did Dr. Adkerson send you to anybody else than to Dr. 
Devine? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did he send you to any other man? 
A. Yes, sir; to some insurance man on 9th Street. 
Q. "\Vas it in the Krise Building T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you ever heard of him before? 
A. Never saw him before. 
Q. You went there because of Dr. Adkerson? 
. A. Yes, sir; I did not where I was going. 
page 5 ~ Q. AU right. "\Vhen you got there-what hap-
pened when you got to Mr, Bdstow's office 1 
A. When I got there he had a·pjece of paper there, and he 
told me, "I might give you a little money.'' I did not lmo-w 
what he ·was going to pay me .for, but I was about to starve 
to death. So., he gave me $150.00 and he told me to sig·n this 
(indicating release). I did not know what it was for. I tried 
to put my name there; I cannot -read or write very well. 
Q. Did you understand what was in the paper? 
A. No, siree ! . 
Q. At the time he gave you that money, had you been paid 
compensation or had any income to buy anything to eatt 
A .. No, sir; I was about to starve to death. 
Q. Did Mr. Bristow g·ive you any paper or anything7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did he not give y0u a slip of paper with something writ-
ten oµ it that you brought to my office? 
A. It was something like that; I do now know what it was. 
Q. You cannot read, you sayi 
A~ No, sir. 
Q. I shall show you and ask you if he wrote out this on this 
piece of paper and gave it to you and told you to go some-
where. 
A. Yes, sir; he gave me that piece of paper (having re~ 
viewed same). 
Q. Did he write that himself? 
A. Yes, sir; but I cannot tell what is on it. 
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Q. Did you· bring this to me Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 6 ~ Note: Said paper, entitled ''Release in Full", 
being a carbon copy, signed and sealed by George 
T. Stone, on January 31, 1945., is reviewed by the hearing C~m-
missioner, also by counsel for defendant, after wl1ich it is 
:filed with this transcript and identified as "Exhibit 'B' ". 
By Mr. Easley: . 
Q. Did I question you about that when you brought it to 
my office? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Easley: I wish to make a statement, if it please your 
Honor, thal on that same date, after having talked to Mr. 
Bristow and finding out what this man (claimant) manifestly 
did not know, if he had executed a release, I immediately 
wrote that letter to Mr. Bristow and filed claim for compensa-
tion. (Exhibits copy of letter.) 
N ot·e : 8aid letter is reviewed by the hearing Commissioner 
and by counsel for defendant. 
Mr. Caskie: The letter is a rather self-serving declaration 
but I shall not object to it. 
Note: Said carbon copy of letter, dated February 7, 1945., 
addressed to E. M::. Bristow, Adjuster, American Fidelity and 
Casualty Co., Krise Building, Lynchburg, Virginia, appar-
ently dictated by John D. Easley, as evidenced by the initials 
"JDE :R" in lower left corner, re ''George Stone v. Vance 
Trucking Company of Henderson, N. C.," is reviewed by hear-
ing Commissioner., after which it is filed with this transcript 
and identified as ''Exhibit 'C' ". 
Mr. Easley: I wish to make another statement, 
page 7 ~ viz., that this man, because the employer did not 
pay compensation, was under duress and compul-
sion. That has been repudiated. But whether or not that 
" 
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is legal or binding, I want to say that, if compensation is 
awarded this man, he is willing to credit the awal'd by the 
amount· which this allegedly third party 'wrongdoer has paid. 
Commissioner: All right. That is what happened any-
way, is it not? 
By Mr. Caskie: . 
Q. You stated that the same day that you went to see Dr. 
Adkerson he then sent you to the man in the Krise Building! 
A. No, sir; not the same day. 
Q. When did he send you to him Y 
A. I do not know exactly when it was. I kn.ow he sent me 
up there to let him examine me to see what it was. 
Q. I mean when he sent you to, the man in the Krise Build-
ing, was that the same day f 
·A. It was the same day when I went to see Dr. Devine. 
Q. When you went to see Dr. Adkerson he immediately sent 
you to Mr. Bristow in the Krise Building f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you first went to s~e Dr. Adkerson you went to 
see·him first about your leg; that is all you complained of that 
dayT . 
A. That is all. It hurt me the same day I fell., but I did 
not pay much attention to it as I thought my leg was broken. 
When I went back to see him, ·the next day, I told him about 
my stomach and he looked at it and said I had a 
page 8 ~ hernia, or, something, I do not know what the name -
was. 
· Q. When you had this fall the pain in your stomach was 
not particularly bad at that time because you ,paid no atten-
tion to iU · 
A. It was not really bad until at night when I went to bed. 
Q. You felt the pain though Y 
A. Yes, sir; when I first had the accident I felt the pain in 
my stomach. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. Between the time you had your accident and when you 
went to Dr. Adkerson and he strapped it up, had you had any 
other injury or fall or strain of any kind 1 · 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. ·when you went to Mr. Bristow, sent there by Dr. Ad-
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kerson, in the Krise Building, did he pay you the same dny ! 
A. Yes, sir, be did. 
Q. That was some· considerable time after the nccident., wa,s 
it not? 
A. Yes, sir; it was a good little while after the accident. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. At that-time did you know what ~he was giving you that 
for? 
A. No, siree I 
Q. Diel you know you were entitled to compensation? 
A. I did not know. · 
Q. Haq. you ever heard about being paid damages for in-
jury!· 
A. No, sir. 
Witness stood aside . 
page 9 ~ . J A.CI{ ADAMS. 
By Mr. Caskie : 
Q~ I believe you are the manager for the George ,v. Helme 
Cowpany here in town Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew of this accident the day it happened, I believe. 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And made a report of itY 
A. Yes, sir,. 
Q. And you sent this man up to Dr. Adkerson f 
A. He did not complain that day. He went up there the 
next morning, I think. He just said, '' Skinned my ankle a 
little,'' Did not say anything at all about his stomach hurt-
ing. . 
Q. The next day did he complain of his stomach or ankle? 
A. I think it was the next-no, I think he went back and 
came back the next day and said his stomach was hurting so ; 
and the doctor examined him and said he was ruptured. 
· Q. The day after the accident he complained of his leg and 
vou sent him to the doctor Y 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the 2d day after the accident he complained flhout 
his stomach 1 
} 
1 
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A. Yes, sir. He did not say anything about the stomach 
at the time of the accident but the next day. 
Q. When you sent him to Dr. Adkerson, did you tell Dr. 
Adkerson to ref er him to anybody else Y · 
A. No, sir. I never heard of Dr. Adkerson's .re-
page 10 } f erring him to anybody else. He does our compen-
sation work. 
Q. You mean liability insurance or compensation,. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you know anything about the insurance carrie1· on 
the truck? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When did you first know that this other. insurance com-
pany represented by Mr. Bristow was mixed up in it? 
A .. I did not know it until Mr. Olsen came down there. I 
did not know they had made a settl~ment or. anything. 
Mr. Charles H. Olsen, representative of the American 
Mutual Liability Insurance Company, ,at Roanoke, Virginia., 
says: ''It was a couple of weeks afterwards." 
By Mr. C~skie: 
Q. It was certainly a month or two afterwards before you 
knew anything about the other insurance carrier f 
A. That is right. 
· Q. Dr. Adkerson had no authority from you to refer him 
to any other insura~ce carrier Y . 
A. That is right; none in the world. I did not know he had 
referred him to anyone. 
Q. You knew nothing at all about this other settlement un-
til sometime after it was made? 
A. Nothing in the world. · 
By :M:r. Easley: 
Q. You g~ve him a card and sent him to the doctor, who al-
ways does whatever is necessary? 
page 11 } A. That is right. · 
Q. And he was authorized to do whatever was 
necessary? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had yori ever instructed Dr. Adkerson not to send liim 
to anybody else, or, to any"other doctor! · 
A. No, sir. 
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... , 
Mr. Caskie: It is admitted that Dr. Adkerson had the right 
to refer him to Dr. Devine. 
By Mr. Easley: 
Q. You all had never paid him any compensation! 
A. No, sir; we left that up to the carrier. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. Did he make ·any compensation claim at all at first? 
A. Well, he came- down there in probably a week and said 
he was hungry and wanted to see about compensation. I told 
him that was up to the insurance company as we had sent in 
the report. 
Witness ·stood aside. 
ELLIS M. BRISTOW. 
By Mr. Caskie : 
Q. You are insurance adjuster, I b<:lieve. 
A. Yes, sir. . . 
Q. What company did you represent in connection with this 
accident to George Stone T · 
A. American Fidelity and Casualty Company, of Richmond, 
Virginia. · 
Q. They were the insurance carrier for the Vance Truck-
ing Company Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 12 ~ Q. Mr. Bristow, there bas been evidence shown 
here that George Stone came in to see you. Tell· 
what yoµ know about it and what happened and what was 
done. 
A. On January 13, 1945, I received a letter from the Rich- · 
mond Office enclosing some correspondence from George W. 
Helme Company and the Vance Trucking Company regarding 
an injury to George Stone., an employee of the Helme Com-
pany. On receipt of this letter I got in touch first with Mr. 
Wingfield, at the Helme Company, and. he got Mr.· Adams 
on the 'phone, and I asked Mr. Adams who was treating this 
man, and he told me· Dr. Adkerson~ Thereupon I called Dr. 
Adkerson and asked him if he lmew where I could get in 
touch with George Stone as I wanted to see him, and told him 
the next time he came in there to have him get in touch with 
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me. Stone came in my office oil January 17, 1945, Dr. Adker-
son having se:nt him up to me at my request. 
Q. When he came in what happened? 
A. I talked to him and took his statement from him, which 
he signed, and told him I would have .to take it up with my 
company, that I did not lmow what thev would do with it, that 
it was a compensation ·case. And 2 days later Mr. Olsen came 
into my office. 
Q. Mr. Olsen of the American Mutual Liability Insurance 
·. Company? · 
A. Yes, sir. And Stone came back to see me several times 
later aud wanted to know what would he done. I explained 
to him that any settlement we made with him would end it 
insofar as we were concerned. And on January 31., 1945, he 
came back into the office and said that we should pay him 
$150.00. I asked him if $150.00 would satisfy him and he 
said, ''Yes," that it would be all right and he would take . 
the money and go back to Martinsville, where he 
page 13 ~ came from. We settled the case with him and he 
signed the release. I read the :release to him, ex-
plaining· it fully, and he said he understood it thoroughly, and 
he signed the release in the presence of Mrs. Cook, who is in 
my office, and of myself, and we witnessed his signature. 
Q. George Stone stated tha·t, when he came into your office, 
you told him you migpt give.him a little m(?ney and gave him 
$150.00. Did that happen in that way? 
A. No. When he came into the office there was no mention 
of any settlement at all. This was on January 31, when we 
settled the case. 
Q. There is a letter from Mr. Easley,, after he came to your 
office from his office, on the same day he signed the release ; 
and he has made that letter a part of the record. 
A. Mr. Easley .is, no doubt, mistaken, because on January 
31, 1945, when he signed the release and got the money, I 
thought he had gone to Martinsville, where l1e said he was 
goµig. And about a week later he came back to my office and 
wanted to know what more we were going to do about it. I 
told him that, so far as the settlement against the Vance 
Trucking Company was concerned, it was closed. And he 
asked me where he could take up about the compensation and 
I wrote the name of the Industrial Commission on a slip of 
paper. 'And he went immediately from my office and, pre-
sumably, he went to Mr. Easley's office because Mr. Easley 
came to my office_ that afteruoon. 
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Q. Do you have a copy of the release which he signed °I 
A. Yes., sir; here it is. (Note: Refers to "Exhibit 'B' ".) 
By Mr. Easley: · 
Q. Mr. Bristow, when was it that you told George Stone 
that be was entitled to· compensation Y 
A. Right on January 17, 1945, when he came in. 
page 14 r Q. And you did not say anyt11ing about a settle-
mentY 
A. No, sir; I did not mention anything about a settlement 
then. · 
Q. Did you give him a slip of paper at that time 1 
A. No, sir; that was when he came back there about a week 
later, after he had settled the case. 
Q. ·when he came in there on January 31, what was he com-
ing in to you for 7 
A. That was the date on which we made the settlement. 
Q. You had told him on January 17 that he was entitled 
to compensation Y 
A. Well, he came on back and said he had not heard from 
anybody and he came back to see what we could do in the 
matter. 
Q. When had you seen Mr. Olsen, representing the insur-
ance carrier for the employer 7 · 
A. I think about January 19, 2 days aftei· Stone was first 
in my office. 
Q. So, then, when he came back on January 31-
A. He had been back in between 2 or 3 times until Janu-
ary 31. · 
Q. And you told him that would settle it so far as Vance 
Trucking Company was conce1·ned 1 
.A. Yes., sir. 
Q • .And you did not tell him that that ":Ould cut him out 
of his compensation 7 . 
A. I told him if he made a settlement against the 3d party 
that would relieve the compensation of any claim against the 
employer. . · 
(J. Those were the words you told him f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 15 r Q. You do not know whether he understood any 
about the compensation carrier Y 
A. No, sir; the employer. 
Q. When he came back on February 7, what was he coming 
back to you for Y 
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A. I do not lmow why he came back to see me, because I 
e,xplained to him fully that, ~hen we settled the ease, that 
would be the end of it so far we were concerned. 
Q. When he came back on February 7, you did give him the· 
name of the Industrial Commission and their address Y · 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. And the name and address of the insurance carrier who 
was to pay him compensation 7 
A. I gave him the name of the compensation insurance car-
rier. 
Q. And that was the same day that I came and asked you 
what the circumstances were? · 
A. Yes~ sit; you came in in the afternoon . 
. Q. And I wrote you the letter on the same day 7 
A. Yes, sir. That was about a week after we had settled 
the case. . · 
Q. No reply has ever been made by either the Vance Truck-
ing Company or its liability insurance carrier to that letter, 
has there? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As far as you know, George Stone had not consulted or 
been advised by anybody about his rights in the premises7 
A. Not that I know. 
Q. Until he came to see me 7 
A. No that I know of. 
·witness stood aside. 
page 16 } Note: Said pencil rp.emorandum ref erred to by 
Mr. Bristow, showing the name of the Industrial 
0Qmmission and their address., also those of the insurance 
carrier for George W. Helme Company, viz., American Mutual 
Liability Insurance C~mpany, etc., is here filed as part of 
this transcript, and is identified as ''Exhibit 'D' ". 
Note: Briefs shall be filed by counsel for the parties, the 
same to be forwarded to the Commission within 2 weeks of" 
this date, each counsel to furnish opposing counsel a copy of 
his brief. _ . · 
Hearing concluded. 
JP §HP!'~~~ Q~yrt (lf A~B~~Js of V~r,giaj~ 
page 17 } ~~Illl'J' ''A'\ 
J. W. DEVINE, M. :P-: 
J. W. DEVINE, JR., ~~- :Q. 
Phone·16p5 
LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA 
~~ricf!n.~u.tuaJ.~iaWlity ~ll§l!~tp1~~ Qq'; 
200 S. Jefferson St. 
:&.oB:n.eke~ Va~ 
May 10, 1~45 
. l 
Re: George Thomas Stone 
Gentlemen: 
I examin~d the above named today, May lQ, 194q~ anf} foµnd 
he has epigastric h_erni~. From the histoJ.!y ~f t4e ~?s~.~ it 
appears he unquestionably cont:r.actecl the h~r!na ~t t~e t~me 
of his injury. 
I would recommend an operation to ~11;re this conditiq~~ 
JO~N W~ DEVINE, M. D. 
JWil/~ 
Q~ AM D,~_ 1Daf?l~Y, A.ttqrn~y 
- ~~c~bl{rg, v a. . . 
page 18 ~ EXHIBIT '' B ''. 
I, George T. Stone, being of legal ag~, :q~~flP.Y a~kµflwl~dge 
receipt of the sum of One Hundred Fifty-Dollars ($150.00) 
in consideration of which sum I hereby release, acquit and 
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forever discharge Vance Trucking Co. Inc. and Veron Bragg 
of and from any and all actions, causes of a"Ction, claims, or 
demands, by reason of or growing out of any damage, loss or 
injury I ever had, now have, or shall or may hereafter have 
in consequence of an accident occurring on or about the 20 
day of December, 1944. 
It is understood and agreed th~t this RELEASE extends 
to all claims of every nature and kind whatsoever, known or 
unknown, suspected or unsuspected. It is further . under-
stood and agreed that the payment of sai,d sum is not and is 
not to be construed as an admission on the part of said Vance 
Trucking Co. Inc. of any liability whatsoever·in consequence 
of said accident. 
AND IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION of said sum to 
me in hand paid, I do hereby assign, subrogate and transfer 
to .................... all claims, rights and choses in action 
which I now have or which I may·hereafter hav~ against any 
and all persons lawfully responsible for the damage, personal 
or property on or about the date aforesaid. 
Witness my h~nd ~nd seal this 31 · day of January, 1945. 
ELLIS M BRISTOW 
Witness 
MRS. B. C. COOK 
Witness 
Dear Sir: 
/ _GEORGE T. STONE (Seal) 
I am a citizen of the United States of America, and have 
been a resident of and domiciled in the United States of 
America conti~uously since April 8, 1940, and I have no con-
nection with any foreign Gov~rnment or Agency. 
/ GEORGE T. STONE. 
Form 26-A Rev. 1-39 5277 
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February 7, 1945. 
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EXHIBIT ''0''. 
E. M. Bristow; Adjuster, American Fidelity & Casualty Co. 
Krise Building 
Lynchburg, Virginia 
Re: George Stone v. Va1~ce Trucking Company of Hender-
. son, N. C. 
George Stone, colored, has just been in to see me about an 
injury sustained by him December 20th, while engaged as an 
employee of the George W. Helme Company, in· loading or 
unloading a truck belonging to the Vance Trucking Company 
of North Carolina. This fnan is wholly illiterate and ignorant, 
and of a very low order of mentality. However, by dint of 
a great deal of questioning, I finally succeeded in getting· suf-
ficient facts to become convinced that he had a clairn. for com-
pensation un..der the Workman's Compensation Act, and also 
a· claim against the Vance Trucking Company for negligently 
furnishing its truck with a defective floor which caused the 
injury. It appears that the accident was immediately reported 
to his employer, who sent him to the employer's doctor and 
the doctor in turn sent him to you. He apparently did not 
know that he was entitled to compensation and what his rights 
were, and never sought advice ·of counsel or anyone else until 
today. He told me that you gave him $:J.50.00 to help him 
out and sug·gested that he take the matter up with the State 
Industrial Commission. He then came to see me. I asked 
him particularly if he had settled his claims for compen~a-
tions or for damages, or whether he had signed any release 
of any such claims, and he seemed very positive that he just 
gave you a receipt for $150.00. Immediately after my con-
ference with Stone I saw you, and you advised me that you 
had paid Stone $150.00 in full settlement of his claims and 
had him sign a release. 
Under all the circumstances, I feel that whatever settlement 
Stone made was made without the advice of counsel and with-· 
out undBrstanding or being advised at all what his ~ights 
were, and that the settlement is not binding upon him, and I 
so advised you orally today. This letter confirms that dis-
avowal. Of course, so far as the Vance Trucking Company 
or its insurer is concerned, the $150.00 will be regarded as a 
credit on his claim against that company, and, if required, he 
will refund the same. 
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I trust that you will promptly advise the Va~ce Trucking 
Company and its insurer of the substance of this letter~ 
JDE:R 
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page 21} {OPINION OF HEARING COMMISSIONER.) 
George Stone, Claimant, 
v. 
George W. Helme Company, Employer, American Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Company, Insurer. 
Claim No. 762-191. 
Jun 5 1945. 
Claimant appeared in person. 
John D. Easley, Attorney-at-law, Krise Building, Lynch-
burg, Virginia, for Claimant. 
Caskie, Frost and Watts (James R. Caskie), Atto~eys-at-
.. 
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law, Peoples National Bank Building, Lynchburg, Virginia. 
for defendant. 
Hearing before Chairman l\TJCKELS, at Lynchburg, Vir-
ginia, May 16, 1945. 
NICKELS, Commissioner, rendered the opinion. 
The claimant sustained a ventral hernia by accident aris-
ing out of and in the course of his employment under the 
provisions of Section 2 ( e) of the Act, on December 20, 1944, 
while working· for the employer at an average weekly wage of 
$32.60. The claimant was unloading sheets of tobacco from 
a truck. The truck had a hole in the floor. The claimant ac-
cidentally stepped into the hole, injuring his ankle and caus-
ing the hernia hereinabove mentioned. There is no dispute 
that the facts show the claimant sustained a compensable ac-
cident pursuant to the terms of the Act, and would have been 
entitled to compensation benefits but for his voluntary settle-
ment and release of the third party whose negligence produced 
the accident. 
The principal issue in the case relates to whether 
page 22 ~ the claimant made an election under the provisions 
of Section 12. The facts pertinent to the foreg·o-
ing issue show that the accident was sustained on the date 
aforesaid. The claimant engaged counsel who completed the 
formal application for a hearing February 13, 1945. This 
application was :filed with the Commission under date of }.,eb-
ruary 15, 1945. The immediate employer, George W. Helme 
Company, completed the Employer's First Report of Acci-
dent on December 21, 1944, and the same was received in the 
office · of the Commission on December 26, 1944. The claim-
ant was ref~rred to the attending physician for the employer 
who filed the Attending Physician's Report under date of De-
cember 29, 1~44. This report covers ~ traumatic injury to 
the left leg and a laceration thereof. It further reports a 
· small ventral hernia to the left of the umbilicus. The latter 
condition was not reported to the attending physician the :first 
day he saw the claimant on December 21, 1944, but was re-
ported two or three visits thereafter. The diagnosis of a 
ventral hernia was further confirmed by another physician 
to whom the claimant was ,referred. The compensation case 
was not adjusted for the reason as shown by letter of the in-
surance carrier of January 30, 1945; liability for ventral 
hernia· was denied and disability from the injury to the left 
leg did not exceed the waiting period of seven (7) days. 
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The truck in which the accident happened by reason of a 
hole in the bed, was owned by Vance Trucking Company, and 
its insurance carrier was the. American Fidelity and Casualty 
Company, of Richmond, Virginia. The accident was reported 
immediately to the Richmond Office, and they reported it 
to Mr. Ellis M. Bristow, theb; agent in Lynchburg, Virginia, 
for adjustment. The adjuster in detailing facts relating to 
the final settlement, testified: 
page 23 r '' On January 13, 1945, I received a letter from 
the Richmond Office enclosing some correspond-
ence from George W. Helme Company and the Vance Truck-· 
ing Company regarding an injury to George Stone, an em-
ploye of the Helme Company. On receipt of this letter I got 
in touch with Mr. Wingfield, at the Helme Company, and he 
got Mr. Adams on the 'phone, and I asked Mr. Adams who 
was treating this man, and he told me Dr. Adkerson. There-
UJ?On I called Dr. Adkerson and asked him if he knew where 
I could get in touch with George Stone as I wanted to see 
him, and told him the next time he came in there to have him 
get in touch with me. Stone came in my office on January 
17, 1945, Dr. Adkerson having sent him up to me at my re-
quest. 
·Q. When he came in what happened 1 
A. I talked to him and took his statement from him, which 
he signed, and told him I would have to take it up with my 
company, that I did not know what they would do with it, that 
it was a compensation case. And 2 days later Mr. Olsen came 
. into my office. . 
Q. Mr. Olsen of the American Mutual Liability Insurance 
Company? .. 
A. Yes, sir. And Stone came back to see me several times 
later and wanted to know what would be done. I explained 
to him that any settlement we made with him would end it 
insofar as we were concerned. And on January 31, 1945, he 
came back into the office and said that we should pay him. 
$150.00. I asked him if $150.00 would satisfy him and he 
said, 'Yes', that it would be all right and he would take the 
money and go back to Ma.rtinsville, where he came from. We 
settled the case with him and he signed the release. I read 
the release to him, explaining it fully, and he· said he under-
stood it thoroughly, and he signed the release in 
page 24 ~ the present of Mrs. Cook, who is in my office, and 
of myself, and we witnessed- his signature. 
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Q. George Stone stated that, when he came into your of-
fice, you told him you mig·ht give him a little money and gave 
him $150.00. Did that happen in that wayY · 
A. No. When he came into the office there was no mention 
of any settlement at all. This was on January 31, when we 
settled the case. 
Q. There is a letter from Mr: Easley, after he came to your 
office from his office, on the same day he signed the release; 
and he has made that letter a part of the record. 
A. Mr. Easley is, no doubt, mistaken, because on January 
31, 1945, when he signed the release and got the money, I 
. think he had gone to Martinsville, where he said he was go-
i~g. And about a week later he came back to my office and 
wanted to know what more we were going· to do about it. I 
told him that, so far as the settlement against the Vance 
Trucking Company was concerned, it was closed. And he 
asked me where he could take up about the compensation and 
I wrote the name of the Industrial Commission on a slip of 
paper. And he went immediately from my office and, pre-
SU]Jlably, he went to Mr. Easley's office because l\fr. Easley 
came to my office that afternoon.'' 
The foregoing statement emphasizes that he told the claim-
ant herein that he was entitled to compensation on, his vi~it 
to see him January 17, 1945, and that he did not mention a 
settlement at that time. A week later Mr. Bristow gave the 
claimant a written memorandum for the purpose of contacting 
the Industrial Commission and the American Mutual Liability 
Insurance Company with reference to his com-
page 25 } pensation rights. On January 31, 1945, the claim-
ant returned with the proposal hereinabove .for 
settling for $150.00. He was paid the same and executed a re-
lease which was worded as follows : · · 
"I, Georg·e T. Sto~e, being of legal age, hereby acknowl-
edge the receipt of the sum of One Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($150.00) in consideration of which sum I hereby release, ac-
quit and forever discharge Vance Trucking Co., Inc., _and 
Veron Bragg of and from any and all actions, causes of ac-
tion, claims, or demands, by reason of or growing out of any 
damage, loss or injury I ever had, now have, or shall or may 
hereafter have in consequence of an accident occurring on or 
about the 20 day of December, 1944 . 
. It is understood and agreed that this RELEASE extends 
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to all claims of every n~ture and kind whatsoever, known or 
unknown, suspected· or· rinsu·specte-d. -
. It is further understood and 'agreed that the payment of 
said sum is not and :is: not t.o be -construed· as an admission 
pn the part of said Vanc·e Trucking. Co., Irie., ~f any liability 
whatsoever in cons·eqrience of s·~id: accident. ': . . . 
. And In F.u·rthifr Consideration of said sum to me in hand 
paid; I clo hereby assign, subroga·te· and traiisf er lo .......... . 
all .e}aims,: rights ~and choses µi .action which I now have or 
which' l may. hereafter have againsf any. :and all pe1~sons law-
fully responsible for the dam~ge; ~ persqnal or property on or 
about the date aforesaid. Witness. my hand and seal this 
31 day qf January, 1945. : · · 
1. •, • I,. • I 
ELLIS M. BRISTOW 
Witness: 
MRS. B. . C. COOK .. 
· Witness.'~ 





page 26 ~ The agent of the insurer for the trucking com-: 
' pany epiphasizes the ·fact he· endeavored· to make 
it clear to the claiinant the execution of the release would bar. 
. the claim for compensation. . · · · · 
: The strongest· appeal was made in the record to the effect 
the claimant herein is an illiterate, without previous business 
~xperience and at the time he executed the release he w~s 
without advice of counsel. This -position does not possess 
merit for the reason the claimant was ·told on more than one 
pccasion that settlement against the third party would bar: 
his compensation· claim. The claimant was given the name 
and address of the -insurance carrier for his immediate em-
ployer- so that he might contact· them.· There 'is not an iota 
of evidence in the record to-the effect any agent of the Ameri-
can Fidelity and Casualty Company perpetrated a fraud or 
.withheld any matter of· value to the claimant which induced 
hitn to settle the case in preference to prosecuting his rights 
under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act. The rec-
ord does not show that the claimant employed counsel until 
after he· had executed a release settling his cause of action 
against the trucking company which produced the accident. 
We are not unmindful of the case of Noblin v. RandolpJi 
Corporation 180 Va. 345, wherein this department went to 
the trouble of tr&eing the variqus amendments of Section 12 
; .. - •. . . ·. \ 
' , 
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in adjudicated cases thereunder prior to the time a .writ of 
error was granted. . . ' 
It is apparent the Court in this case held there was no 
prejudice to the employer by the claimant having obtained 
a worthless judgment against the third party. The Court 
· held the immediate employer was estopped to set up such 
defense for the reason it had encouraged the claimant in 
prosecution of the third party suit resulting in a 
page 27 ~ verdict against an insolvent person. None of the 
elements of an estoppel on the part of the imme-
diate employer is present in the instant case. The claimant 
herein should have filed his claim for compensation and ob-
tained a repair of the hernia by radical operation pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 2 ( e) and then have permitted the 
insurance carrier under subrogation rights afforded by Sec-
tion 12, to. prosecute the third party suit against the trucking 
company. The manner of settlement has taken away and 
defeated the valuable rights of subrogation of the employer 
in the instant case. It is perfectly obvious th~ cost of com-
pensation benefits and the medical expense incident to the 
hernia will exceed the sum of $150.00, for whic.h the claimant 
settled with the third party. It must be observed that Sec-
tion 12 of the .Act places no prohibition whatsoever upon an 
injured person making a settlement with the third party whose 
negligence is responsible for his injuries. Under the circum-
stances. proven the claimant may have elected to proceed 
against the negligent third party, or file a claim against his 
immediate employer. He elected to accept a settlement against 
the third party which destroyed the right of subrogation on 
behalf of the employer under Section 12. 
In the Noblin Case it is stated: 
"The section is so worded that it gives to the injured em-
ploye an opportunity to obtain one :full recovery but pro-
hibits him from receiving a double recovery for his injuri~s. 
The right of the injured employe to pursue his action at 
law ag·ainst the negligent third party is not prohibited. How-
ever, in the exercise of that common law right, he must not 
prejudice the right of subrogation given to the employer. 
However, if the statutory right of subrogation is not ·im-
paired by reversing the procedure suggested, there 
page 28 ~ is no reason to hold a judgment procured in the 
common law action a bar to tl;te claim for compen-
sation.'' 
George Stone v. George W. Rehn~ Co., et al 39 
The claimant having obtained one full recovery volnntarily 
and free from fraud to the prejudice of the employer, the 
same constitutes an electi<m, and in our opinian bars the pro-
ceedings under the. Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, 
and for this reason the case is dismissed from the docket. 
Each party shall pay its respective costs. 
page 29 ~ COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
RICHMOND 14 
Claim No. 762-191 
Case of George Stone Accident 12-20-44 
NOTICE OF AW ARD. 
To George W. Helme Com-
pany 
Box 488 Lynchburg, 
Virginia (Employer) 




and American :Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Co. 
(Insurance Carrier) 
Mutual Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia 
Date June 5, 1945. 
John D. Easley, .Attorney R 
Krise Buildi~ . . 
Lynchburg, V1rg1Ii1a 
Caskie, Frost ·and Watts, 
.A.ttys. R 
Peoples National Bank 
Building 
Lynchburg, Virginia 
You are hereby notified that a hearing was held in the aboye 
styled case her ore Nickels,. Chairman, at Lynchburgf Virginia, 
on May 161 .1945, and a decision rendered on June 5, 1945, 
dismissing this claim on the ground the claimant obtained one 
full recovery voluntarily and free from fraud to the preju-
dice of the employer, constituting an election, which bars pro-
ceedings under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act. 
40 Supreme. Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Each party shali pay it~ own costs in this proceeding. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
W. F. ROBINSON, Chairman. 
Attest: 
W. F. BURSEY, Secretary. 
page 30 r (OPINION ON REVIEW.) 
George Stone, Claimant, 
v. 
George W. Helme Company, Employer; American Mutual 
µab. Ins. Co., Insurer. 
Claim No. 762-191. 
Jul 311945 
Submitted by brief on behalf of· Claimant by John D. Eas-
ley, Attorney-at-law, Lynchburg, Va. -
Submitted by brief on behalf of Defendant by Caskie, Frost 
& Watts, Attorneys-at-law, Lynchburg, Virginia.· 
Review by the full Commission, at Richmond, Virginia, on 
July 30th, 1945. 
DEANS, Commissioner, rendered the opinion. 
Review of this claim by the Full Commission was requested 
by claimant who was aggrieved at the decision of Nickels, 
Chairman, and award of June 5th, 1945, whereby his claim 
for compensation benefits was denied on the ground he had 
obtained one full recovery for injuries received in the acci-
dent of December 20th, 1944. 
By agreement of all parties the claim was submitted for 
review before the Full Commission without any appearances 
or notice of hearing of review. There£ ore, the claim is now 
received by the Full Commission upon the previous recor<;l 
and briefs of all parties of· interest. 
Claims involving third parties as well as the rights of the 
employer, employe and compensation insurance carrier raise 
George Stone v. George ,v. Helme Co., ct al. 41 
many questions so that Section 12 of our .A.ct ·has 
page 31 ~ been amended by our General .Assembly on several 
occasions and construed by our Court of .Appeals 
following· each amendment. 
This Commission now follows the decision of our Court of 
.Appeals in the case of Noblin, v. Randolph Corporation, 180 
Va. 345, as this decision construes Section 12 as it now stands. 
In the Noblin case the employer suggested that claimant prose-
c11 te his claim for damages against the third party. This 
was done and a judgment secured for an amount exceeding 
the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. How-
ever, this judgment wa~ uncollectible so that claimant se-
cured no effects from it. There was nothing to indicate claim-
ant had prejudiced the claim of the employer nor had he se-
cured one recovery,-he had secured only an empty judgment 
and presumably the employer could have done no better. 
In this claim under consideration, the employer sent the 
injured to the doctor and proceeded to report the claim to 
the compensation carrier. This accident occurred December 
20th, 1944, and the employer's report, dated December 21st, 
was received in the claims office of the insurance carrier in 
Richmond on December 22nd, 1944, and in the office of the 
Industrial Commission on December 26th, 1944. The report 
of Dr. W. C . .Adkerson was dated December 29th, 1944, re-
ceived in the carrier's office January 2nd, 1945, and the In-
dustrial Commission's offices on January 3rd, 1945, so that 
it will be seen the employer and insurance carrier had given 
the claim routine consideration and made proper report to the 
Industrial Commission. 
On January 30th, 1945, the District Claim Manager for the 
insurance carrier advised the Commission that it would not 
voluntarily assume liability for the hernia, and that 
page 32 ~ the .other injuries did not cause aisability in ex-
cess of seven days. Thi~ information was trans-
mitted to claimant by the Claim Division of the Industrial 
Commission on January 31st, 1945, at which time claimant 
was also furnished form upon which to apply for a hearing 
before the Commission. .Application for hearing was filed by 
claimant's attorney on February 14th, 1945. 
~.The settlement between this claimant and tne attorney rep-
resenting the insurance carrier for the third party, Vance 
T:rucking Company, was made January 31st, 1945, and in the 
amount of $150.00. Now here does it appear the employer or 
the representative of the compensation carrier was a party 
to the negotiations leading up to this settlement. The evi-
dence indicates the Claims .Attorney, Mr. Bristow, represent-
42 Supreme (Jourt .of Appeals of Virginia 
ing the third party's auto. liability insurance carrier re-
ceived notice of the accident from the carrier's office to ascer-
tain the name of. the attending physician, ·and upon securing 
this he called the physician and asked him to send the claim-
ant to his office on his next visit. This appears to be the 
only contact the Claims Attorney for the third party had 
with the employer. 
Claimant called at the claimant's attorney's office and on 
the second visit the settlement was made and release takmi. 
Now here does it appear the compensation carrier for the em-
ployer was a party to the negotiations. Claimant acted with-
out ·advice of counsel as is done in many claims of this nature. 
He knew he was to receive $150.00 and that he had to sign his 
name to. some document. When settlement was made and he 
had affixed his signature to the release he had proceeded as 
far as he could with his legal remedy for damages against. 
the third party, the Vance Trucking Company. He had had· 
one full recovery,-fnll and complete in its' legal aspects re-
gardless of the'amount of money received. He had 
page 33 t prejudiced his employer and the compensation car-
rier to the. extent that the release he had executed 
for the consideration he had received of $150.00 would be a 
complete bar to any further proceedings against the Vance 
Trucking Company. _ 
Nowhere does there appear to have been co11usion or fraud 
between the employer and his compensation carrier, on the 
one side, and the claimant's attorney for the third party, the 
Vance Trucking Company, on the other side. 
For the above reasons the Full Commission affirms the de-
cision of Nickels, Chairman, and the award of June 5th, 1945, 
and adopts said decision and award as of the Full Commis-
sion. 
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DEPARTMENT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
RICHMOND 14 
Claim No. 762-191 Accident 12-20-44 
Case of George Stone 
George Stone v. George W. Helme Co., et al. 43 
NOTICE OF AW A.RD. 
To George W. Helme Com-
pany (Employer) 
Date July 31, 1945. 
Box 488 Lynchburg, John D. Easley, Attorney R 
Virginia Krise Building 
and George Stone ( Claim- Lynchburg, Virgb;tla , 
ant)· 
Gener~! Delivery Caskie, Frost & vVatts, 
Lynchburg, Virginia Attorneys R 
and American Mutual Lia- Peoples' National Bank 
bility Insurance Corri- Building 
pany (Insurance Car- Lynchburg, Virginia 
rier) 
Mutual Building 
Richmond 19, Virginia 
You are hereby notified that a Review was held in the above 
styled case before the Full Commission at .Richmond, Vir-
ginia, on July 30, 1945, and a decision rendered on July 31, 
1945, adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
of the Hearing Commissioner as those of the Full Commis-
sion on Review and affirming the Commission's award of 
June 5, 1945, dismissing this claim. . 
Attest: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA. 
W. F. ROBINSON, Chairman. 
W. F. BURSEY, Secretary. 
page 35 ~ I, W. F. Bursey, Secretary of the Industrial 
Commissio.n of Virginia, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing, according to the record of this office, is a true 
and correct copy of the statement of findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and other matters pertinent to the questions 
at issue in Claim No. 762-191, re: 
George Stone, Claimant, 
v. . 
George W. Helme. Company, Employer, American Mutual 
Liability Insurance Company, Insurer. 
44 Supreme 0ourt of Appeals of Virginia 
I further certify that counsel representing the employer, 
the -George W. Helm.e Company, have notice that the Secre-
tary of the Industrial Commission of Virginia had been re-
quested to prepare a certified copy of the record for the pur-
pose of an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. 
I further certify that counsel representing the claimant, 
Georg.e Stone, received, as evidenced. by the United States pos-
tal Registry Return Receipt Card, on Augus~ 2, 1945, a copy 
of the award of the Industrial Commission of Vitginia, dated 
July 31, 1945. 
Given under my hand and the seal of the Industrial Com-
mission- of Virginia, this the 17 day of August, 1945. . 
(Seal) W. F. BURSEY, . 
Secretary, Industrial Commission of Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. ·B. WATTS, C. C. 
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